This paper presents a novel mathematical model for the TCP Tragedy of the Commons, using Game Theory concepts. This tragedy may appear in a TCP/IP based network when hosts do not respect the protocol rules and try to monopolize the shared network resources by using a selfish strategy. Our model quantifies the effects of this evil behavior in a simple and standard network topology and allows obtaining some interesting results which we formally prove. Finally, we validate the model results by comparing its predictions with a set of extensive simulations carried out using the NS Network Simulator.
Introduction
Many important communication systems in our days are based on the principle of sharing a common resource among different users. Some of the most relevant examples are the Aloha protocol [1] , where the shared resource is a radio link bandwidth, the Ethernet system [2] , inspired in Aloha, in which all the emitters share the communication capacity of a wire and the conventional TCP/IP networking scheme [3, 4] , where all the users in a route share the same communication link and also the same buffering capabilities of a particular switch. One of the main objectives of the communication protocols in those systems is to establish a number of rules guaranteeing that the common resources are shared fairly among all the users. When a protocol is well designed and all the competitors respect its rules, normally, the communication capabilities are adequately split. Nevertheless, when a user does not cooperate and presents an evil behavior by not respecting the protocol rules, it is possible that unfair or unstable behaviors emerge in the system. One of the main problems in relation with this concern is that protocols usually provide no means for guaranteeing or checking whether users respect the rules or cheat.
Many authors have already noticed that the conventional TCP end-to-end congestion control scheme is voluntary in nature and critically depends on end-user cooperation [5, 6] . TCP was originally designed in the context of an academic network where all users tend to collaborate. For this reason, the fundamental objective of TCP was to supply a reliable delivery of packets between two applications on different hosts. Then, the congestion control mechanism used by the protocol is mainly based on two principles, which might be sketched in the following way:
(1) Each time a packet is lost in a connection, TCP reduces the sending rate of that connection (approximately to half). (2) TCP tries to avoid the duplication of packets in the network. That is, TCP does not repeat a transmitted packet until it is (almost) sure that the packet has been really lost.
When all hosts comply with these principles, TCP guarantees that the communication resources are optimally used and fairly shared. Nevertheless, both rules are based on an end-to-end voluntarily acceptance of the rules by the users, without any verification from the network. Nothing prevents a particular user from presenting an evil behavior, and continue increasing its sending rate, even if there are packet losses, or to repeat a particular packet as many times as it wishes until the appropriate acknowledgement has been received.
The problem that arises in this situation is that, as some authors have already remarked [7, 8] , most Internet routers use a drop-tail FIFO (First In First Out) scheduling discipline. In this case, each host can obtain more network bandwidth by transmitting more packets per unit time because this policy gives the most resources to the sender of the most packets. Nevertheless, if the hosts overload the network, it may be demonstrated that the total throughput drops [7] . Thus, the optimal strategy for each host is strongly suboptimal for the network as a whole. Using a Game-Theory view [9, 10] , this kind of problems arising in TCP/IP networks are strongly related to the stability of multi-players games. In particular, the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem is an example of a game with this property. But a closer analogue is the, so called, Tragedy of the Commons [11] problem in economics, where each individual can improve their own position by using more of a free resource, but the total amount of the resource degrades as the number of users increases. Historically, this analysis was applied to the use of common grazing lands; it also applied to such diverse resources as air quality and time-sharing systems.
In general, experience indicates that many-player systems with this type of instability tend to go into serious trouble.
This problem of the TCP protocol has already been addressed in the networking literature using a game-theoretical perspective. Some of the most remarkable works in this field are the ones carried out by Nagle [7, 8] and Garg et al [5] . Both of them propose a solution based on creating incentive structures in the systems that discourage evil behavior. The first one suggests replacing the single FIFO queue associated to each outgoing link with multiple queues, one for each source host, which are served in a round-robin fashion. The second, introduces a novel and sophisticated sample service discipline called RIS (Rate Inverse Scheduling) that punishes evil behavior and rewards cooperation, in such a way that the resulting Nash equilibrium leads to fair allocation of resources. Both solutions require a (sometimes huge) per-packet processing capability, which might be impractical in many realistic applications as in Internet core routers for example. There are other interesting proposals related to problems similar to this [12] [13] [14] [15] , and in all cases, these works show the potential applications of Game Theory within the problem of congestion control and routing in packet networks.
As it can be observed, the available networking literature on this topic mainly concentrates in proposing possible solutions to these problems, but we believe there is a lack of appropriate mathematical models allowing a better understanding of the TCP Tragedy of the Commons and a quantification of its effects. One of the few works in this direction is the one by Nagle [7] , who showed this tragedy to be really tragic by proving that a packet network with infinite storage, FIFO scheduling, and a finite packet lifetime will, under overload, drop all packets. This is a very remarkable work, but is based, somehow, on too restrictive assumptions, which drive the model to highly pessimistic results. Besides, it does not explicitly contemplate the effect of the tragedy when only a fraction of the users present the evil behavior.
In this direction, our objective in this paper is to develop a novel mathematical model to quantify the effect of the Tragedy of the Commons in the TCP protocol. With this purpose, we use an approach completely based on Game Theory, trying to analyze the problem as a N-player game, where N rivals compete for a limited resource. 
The Model
The model we propose in this paper is based on the simplest switching topology we could imagine, which is the one depicted in Fig. 1 . In this network, we have N hosts (the players), which compete for sending packets to a remote host, which we call the Destination. Packets from the N players are routed in a single switch, which we call the Router. This Router is assumed to have a finite queue of size m packets, which is scheduled using a FIFO discipline. The buffer management policy is drop tail, which means that when the queue is full, all new incoming packets are dropped. Hence, all competitors share the same buffering capabilities and the same communication link to reach the Destination.
Once we have described the interconnecting topology, we may introduce the network dynamics of our model, which is somehow inspired in the one proposed by Borodin et al. [16] . In this direction, we assume the network to be a directed graph where all links have the same capacity. Time proceeds in discrete steps, so that packets travel atomically consuming one time step to traverse any of the links. We consider that a packet abandons its origin node at the beginning of a step and arrives at its destination node at the end of that step. Then, a buffer position may be occupied by one packet (outgoing) at the beginning of a time slot and by another different packet (incoming) at its end. One novelty we introduce is that, given that the buffer size is limited to m packets and the queue policy is fixed to drop tail, all packets trying to access the buffer in a particular time slot have the same probability of entering into it. In the simple case where m = 1, this means that if n packets try to access this buffer in a particular time step, the probability of any of them to occupy it is 1/n. As none of the hosts is privileged, we say that our queuing policy is fair.
The modelization of a full-featured TCP implementation is far beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, for our model, we assume a simplified version, which captures its essential aspects and behaviors. In this direction, we accept our hosts implement a trivial TCP (tTCP) protocol, fulfilling two main postulates:
(1) The tTCP protocol optimizes the use of the common resource for reliable transmission of packets. (2) The common resource is fairly shared among all the players (the hosts).
We are not interested on the mechanism used by the protocol to achieve these objectives. We just accept that, on steady state, it manages to find, for each host, the appropriate input rates and time schedules to accomplish the two postulates. Observe that a real-world TCP implementation also has these two objectives, in the sense that it tries to order the behavior of the hosts for obtaining the maximum profit in a communication network and equitably sharing the resources among all the users. A very important point is that we make our tTCP protocol reliable by assuming that a connection is always sending the same packet until it properly arrives to its destination. For simplicity, we do not contemplate any explicit acknowledgement mechanism, we just assume that when the destination receives a packet, the originator of that packet gets automatically informed. Although this may seem a too naive assumption, it may be showed that it does not introduce any remarkable modification on the behavior of the hosts. These simple mechanisms allow claiming that our model is connection oriented, because using them, it is sure that all packets will, sooner or later, arrive to their destinations and they will do it in the correct order.
Once we know all the details about the proposed model, we may define the possible strategies a player may adopt to participate in this game. For simplicity, we assume a host has only two possibilities: to be fair and collaborate, or to be evil and cheat. A fair player is one complying with the rules imposed by the tTCP protocol we have defined. On the other hand, an evil player is one following a selfish strategy, and hence breaking these rules. In order to be able to perform a mathematical analysis of the model, we adopt a more precise definition of these terms. The next paragraphs are devoted to this.
To define the fair behavior, consider a situation where all the players cooper-ate and respect the tTCP protocol. Following our initial hypothesis, after a transient period, the tTCP internal mechanism guarantees that the resources are being used optimally and fairly among all the users. In this situation, it is easy to understand that the most optimal and fair solution is to share the network capabilities using a round-robin cyclic service algorithm. In this case, the proposed protocol divides the available time in a sequence of groups of N slots. Each player owns one exclusively reserved time slot in each of these groups to send its packet. Once a packet has been send, the host must wait N − 1 time slots to be able to send another. We assume fair players are greedy in the sense that they always use their time slot to send a packet. With these ideas, it is possible to formally define the behavior of a fair player in the following way. Given a host i ∈ 1, ..., N , the tTCP protocol assigns to it an exclusive time slot s i ∈ 1, ..., N in each round (the same for all rounds). We say that this host is fair when the probability of host i sending a packet in slot j of a round is
That is, we assume fair players use only one out of the N available time slots, independently on whether some of the other N − 1 remaining players present evil behavior.
On the other hand, we have evil hosts, which do not respect the protocol rules. We may define the evil behavior in many different ways, but one of the simplest is the following. Given a host i ∈ 1, ..., N , we say this host is p i -evil when it forgets about the time slot the protocol has assigned to it and sends a packet in any time slot with probability p i . That is
For simplicity, we assume all evil hosts share the same probability p. Hence, p i = p for all i. Without loss of generality, we may assume that N e hosts present p-evil behavior and N f present fair behavior. As all hosts have only one of these two possibilities, it must be satisfied that N e + N f = N .
Once we have defined the set of possible strategies in the network, our objective is to evaluate the transmission rate for any of the hosts as a function of its own strategy and of the strategy of the others. The transmission rate measures the average number of useful packets a given host sends on a time slot. Hence, it is measured in packets/slot. We will call R e (N, N e , p) the transmission rate for evil hosts in a network of N hosts, when N e of them present p-evil behavior.
In the same way, we will call R f (N, N e , p) the transmission rate of fair hosts in a network of N elements when N e of them present p-evil behavior.
To evaluate R e (N, N e , p), it is necessary to introduce previously some new concepts. Note that our tTCP protocol divides the available time in a round in N different slots. Observe that a particular time slot has only to possibilities:
(1) To be assigned to a host that behaves with evil behavior (Type E slot).
(2) To be assigned to a host that behaves with fair behavior (Type F slot).
Without loss of generality, we assume the simple case where the buffer size m = 1. Observe that in terms of accessing probabilities, this is equivalent to a situation where the buffer is full and on each time slot there is only a single free buffer position that can be accessed by the hosts. Thus, in a type E slot, the players competing for the shared buffer position are N e evil hosts. Remember we have assumed that these hosts send a packet with probability p and that the queue is fair. Hence, given a particular host, this host has probability 1 of success when it is the only one sending a packet in that slot, event which occurs with probability p(1−p) Ne−1 . In the same way, the host has probability 1/2 of succeeding when only it and another host are sending packets, which happens with probability p
We could continue with this reasoning until we get to the situation where all evil players send a packet (p
Ne−1 ). In this case, the probability of success is 1/N e . Hence, we can conclude that the probability of a particular evil host to really transmit a packet through the shared resource in a type E slot is the sum of all these different contributions
This sum can be evaluated (see Appendix A) to the value
Following a similar argument, it is possible to obtain an analogous expression for a type F slot. The main difference is that, in that kind of slot, there is, with probability 1, a packet coming form the corresponding fair host having assigned that slot. In this case, it can be easily shown that the probability of an evil host to really transmit a packet on a F slot is given by
This expression can also be evaluated using a similar procedure as the one of Eq.(4) to a value of
We may proceed in a similar way to evaluate the transmission probability for a fair host. In this case, the analysis is easier because this type of host can only transmit in a particular F slot which is assigned to it by the protocol. The number of packets competing to enter the shared buffer depends on the behavior of the N e players trying also to access the common resource. It may be easy shown that, in this situation, the probability of the fair host to really transmit its packet in its F slot is
As in the preceding cases, this sum can also be simplified to a value
These probabilities are essential for the evaluation of the transmission rates. Nevertheless, to accomplish this task, it is also necessary to define an appropriate framework describing the behavior of the hosts in terms of a set of states characterizing the evolution of packets within the network. The following section has the objective of introducing the simplest way of doing it.
The Stateless Approach
In this section we propose an extremely simplifying assumption which consists on considering that the network is stateless. This supposition may be assimilated as a situation where all the packets entering the router buffer are useful (that is, duplicates are not allowed). As this network must have little latency, we may assume that the buffer size is fixed to m = 1 . Although these assumptions may seem too simplistic, they allow us to introduce some important concepts that are essential for the understanding of the rest of this paper.
In this situation, given that the number of slots in a round is N and that there are exactly N e type E slots and N − N e type F slots in the round, we may Fig. a) has been evaluated using an evil probability p = 0.1. In Fig. b) , p = 0.25. The line with solid triangles represents the evil rate R e (N, N e , p). The line with solid circles represents the fair rate R f (N, N e , p). The dotted line indicates the initial yield of fair hosts, R f (N, 0, p). As it can be observed, in both cases the game is a Tragedy of the Commons because there is always an incentive for a new player to become evil and the final rate of evil hosts in the Nash equilibrium, R e (N, N, p), is always under the initial yield of fair players R f (N, 0, p).
prove that the average transmission rate for an evil host can be expressed in the following way
We may proceed in a similar way for evaluating the transmission rate for fair hosts. In this case, there is only one single slot in the round where the host may send a packet. Hence, it is straightforward that the average transmission rate for a fair host is
In the framework of Game Theory, the preferred method for quantifying the effects of noncooperation in N-player games is by evaluating the reward as a function of the number of defectors. In our case, these rewards are the transmission rates R e and R f , which indeed depend on the number of defectors N e but also on the probability p associated to the evil hosts. It may be easily demonstrated that different types of games are possible in our model depending on the value of p. We are specially interested in the case where the game takes the form of a Tragedy of the Commons. It may be shown (See Theorem 1 in Appendix B) that the game we propose takes the form of a Tragedy of the Commons for values of p in the interval p ∈ ( for all i = 1, ..., N − 1), which guarantees that the Nash equilibrium is reached when all hosts are evil (N = N e ). Besides, when the number of evil players increases, the performance of the system degrades, so that when this equilibrium is reached, the final rate is worse than the rate offered by the protocol if all hosts collaborate (i.e. R e (N, N, p) < R f (N, 0, p)). These arguments may be graphically observed in Fig. 2 , where we show the evolution of R e and R f as a function of the number of defectors, N e , in a game with N = 25 players.
Then, we may conclude that our simple model presents a Tragedy of the Commons phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is an aspect of these results that requires a more exhaustive analysis. If we observe Fig. 3 , it is possible to remak that, in the Nash equilibrium, the evil rate R e (N, N, p) increases when p grows (This is also demonstrated in Appendix B as part of de proof of Lemma 5). Moreover, we may easily prove that when p = 1, R e (N, N, p) = R f (N, 0, p) = 1/N . This means that, increasing the greediness of the evil players, it is possible to minimize the tragedy and even make it disappear. This conclusion is somehow unnatural, because it suggests that the proposed communication protocol inspired in TCP is as efficient as a totally disordered situation based only in the absolute selfishness of the users. If these results were true in the real Internet, there would be no need for any congestion control mechanism other than encouraging the users to send as many packets as possible. This odd behavior appears because when we assumed the stateless approach, we withdrew a very important effect that is present in real networks but which is not exhibited here. As some authors have already remarked [7] , one of the main problems in packet networks is the presence of duplicated packets. The stateless model does not contemplate this possibility. For this reason, we are going to improve the suitability of the model by assuming a more realistic situation assuming that large buffers are possible and that the acknowledgement of the packets only occurs when they arrive to their final destination. The following section is devoted to this objective.
The Markovian Approach
In this section, we recover the model presented previously but now we assume that the router buffer has a drop-tail queue of m packets, where m may be different from 1. In this situation, it is necessary to track the position of the packets within the buffer for both, evil and fair hosts. If we start with fair hosts, we may remark that this kind of players sends only one packet on each round of N slots. In order to simplify the analysis, we make a reasonable hypothesis and assume that N ≥ m (it may be shown that for N < m we obtain similar conclusions but the analysis becomes more complicated). Hence, fair hosts never have duplicates because the time between two successive packet injections is smaller than their maximum lifetime in the network. For this reason, we may claim that all the packets from fair hosts that get to the router buffer are useful. This means that the new m-buffer transmission rate R f (N, N e , p, m) is equal to the one evaluated in Eq.(10).
Nevertheless, when we consider evil hosts, things are much more different because they try to access in all slots with probability p. Hence, the presence of duplicate packets is possible and not all the packets accessing the router buffer contain useful information. To mathematically analyze this situation, we have associated to each evil host a Markov Chain as the one depicted in Fig. 4 . In this chain, the states are defined as a function of the position in the buffer of the oldest useful packet of the considered host. In state 0, no useful packets of this hosts are present in the buffer. In state 1 there is only one useful packet which occupies the last position of the buffer (following the buffer FIFO policy, it will be served within m time slots). In state 2, this packet has moved to the next buffer position. In this case, another packet of the same host could occupy the preceding buffer place. We do not differentiate this case because the packet can only be a duplicate of the previous one, which has not yet arrived to its destination. In this way, we get to state m, in which the router sends that packet to the destination. Remember that, in our model, we have assumed that there exists an immediate hidden acknowledgement mechanism that allows the host to be aware of the arrival. Given this, the chain goes to state 0, because the host stops repeating the same packet and starts sending a new one which is not yet in the network. Observe that all the preceding duplicate packets existing in the network are not really useful, for this reason Fig. 4 . The figure shows a schema of the Markov Chain proposed to emulate the evolution of packets from a host in the router buffer. In state 0 there are no useful packets in the buffer. In the rest of the cases, the state reflects the position of the useful packet within the buffer. The transition probability q indicates the probability of the host to occupy the free buffer position with its packet in a time slot. Once the packet is in the FIFO buffer, its probability to pass to the next state is always 1. When the packet is delivered (state m), the host is immediately notified and it starts sending a new packet in state 0.
we do not consider them.
To perform the analysis of this chain we assume that the network has reached its steady state. In this state, we accept that the presence of greedy evil hosts makes the buffer queue to be always full and, on each time slot, only one buffer position (the last one) is liberated when the first packet is served and the rest advance one position. In this situation, the transition probability q of Fig. 4 , is the probability for an evil host to obtain this free buffer position in a time slot. Observe that this problem has already been addressed in the evaluation of the probabilities p e E and p e F of Eqs. (3, 5) . In fact, it can be understood that q is not really a constant probability. It depends on whether the considered time slot is of E type or F type. Then, the chain we have proposed is not really Markovian because the q transition probability is not constant. To make it become Markovian, it would be necessary to take into account the particular owner of each time slot within the state chain. If we do so, the chain would become too complicated and the analysis would be too complex to be useful. For this reason, we propose an approximation that can supply the appropriate information and significantly simplifies the operations. Our idea consists on proposing a couple of assumptions, one pessimistic and the other optimistic. Both of them are approximations of the real behavior, which must be somewhere between these two extremes. In both cases q is a constant probability and, hence, the proposed chains are Markovian. Hence, the calculations may be performed easily using the standard techniques to evaluate the stationary probabilities.
The optimistic approximation consists on assuming that all time slots are of type E. This means that we consider that in all time slots the only hosts trying to access the buffer are the evil ones. In reality, fair hosts are also trying to send packets in type F slots. For this reason, this approximation overestimates the access probability of evil hosts in type F slots and this is why we say it is optimistic. It may be easily shown that, using this criterium, the optimistic transition probability, q opt , is equal to the p e E probability described in Eq. (3):
In the pessimistic approximation we make a similar supposition, but now considering that all slots are of type F . Then, we assume that in all slots there are always N e evil hosts sending a packet with probability p plus a fair host doing so with probability 1. Observe that in reality this only happens in F slots, and we are underestimating the access probability of evil hosts in E slots. It can be shown that, in this situation, the pessimistic transition probability, q pes , is equal to the p e F probability of Eq. (5):
Once we have established these approximation, we can observe that by using any of them the chain proposed in Fig. 4 becomes a real Markov Chain. In this situation, the transition matrix of the chain becomes an m × m matrix of the form 
The stationary probabilities of the different states can be obtained by calculating the normalized eigenvector associated to the first eigenvalue, which can be easily evaluated as
Since a useful packet is only really transmitted when the state m is reached (when the packet is sent out by the router to its destination), the probability of a useful packet to be issued in a time slot is given by the probability of state m, which is q 1+mq
. Hence, we can conclude that the useful transmission rate for evil hosts in the optimistic, R 
and by
respectively. Remark that the real rate of evil hosts must be always located among these two extremes. (N, 0, p, m) , which guarantees the final yield to be under the performance of the ordered situation. In this case, there is an interesting conclusion that can be extracted from Eqs. (13, 14) . When the value of m increases, the reward obtained by evil hosts decreases. This effect is shown in Fig. 5 , where we show the evil (optimistic and pessimistic) and fair rates as a function of the number of evil hosts, N e , for N = 25. As it can be observed, the effect of the tragedy becomes more considerable when m grows, because the evil rate in the Nash equilibrium decreases with this parameter. This phenomenon is produced by the effect of evil duplicates, which occupy more and more of the shared resources, but which do not provide any advantage in terms of transmission rate neither to evil nor to fair players.
An extremely interesting conclusion that can be obtained from the model is that, in contrast with some previous proposed models [8] , the global performance of the network does not necessarily drop to zero (the network does not drop all packets). In fact, it can be easily shown using Eqs. (5, 7, 10, 14) that for completely greedy evil players (p = 1), the worst network performance (achieved when all players are evil) falls to for fair players (remember we assume N ≥ m), and to
for evil hosts in the pessimistic approximation. Hence, in a network full of evil greedy players, a fair host has a performance with decreases with the square of the number of hosts, while the evil players have a performance which decreases proportionally to the number of hosts.
Another interesting conclusion can be obtained by investigating how the incentive for a new host to become evil evolves. This incentive can be defined . This picture shows the incentive to become evil as a function of the number of evil hosts in a network with N = 25 hosts. As it can be observed, the incentive decreases when m grows. In the simulations the evil probability has been fixed to a value p = 0, 6. using a pessimistic approach as
This measures the relative increase in yield a host would obtain by becoming evil. As it can be observed in Fig. 6 , in the Markovian model, Υ decreases with m. This is a very interesting conclusion, because it shows that when the effect of the tragedy is more important (m high), the incentive to cheat is lower.
Simulations
The tTCP protocol we have defined imitates TCP, but using extremely simplified assumptions. Our objective in this section is to show that this simplification does not miss the essential aspects of the real protocol. With this purpose, we have performed an extensive set of simulations to show that the behavior of the conventional TCP protocol is very close to the predictions of our model.
The simulations have been carried out using the popular NS Network Simulator [17] . The fair hosts have been implemented using BayFullTCP agents, which comply with the TCP conventional standard. To implement the evil behavior we have developed a new type of agents based on the BayFullTCP code, but which obey a strategy based on selfishness. The EvilBayFullTCP agents we have created have all the necessary ingredients of the protocol to work appropriately, but some of its pieces have been modified to emulate the greediness of this kind of players. In particular, the TCP congestion control algorithm [18] , which calculates the size of the congestion window, has been altered so that this window never decreases. Practically, this means that after a short transient, the congestion window in evil hosts reaches the maximum allowed size. Besides, in EvilBayFullTCP, we have also modified the retransmission timeout, which is no longer calculated using the Jacobson algorithm [18] . Evil hosts impose a fixed timeout, T e , which is shorter than the RTT (Round Trip Time) of the packets in the network. Observe that T e is related with the p probability of evil hosts in the sense that a high value of p corresponds with a low value of the timeout.
The graphs depicted in Fig. 7 represent the normalized evil and fair transmission rates obtained in the simulations. Here, normalized means that we have divided the transmission rates by the effective capacity of the communication links. Hence, the transmission rate for fair hosts when no evil hosts are present is always 1/N , where N is again the number of players. Thanks to this normalization, we can easily compare these pictures with the theoretical results depicted in Fig. 5 . As it can be observed, the qualitative behavior obtained through the simulations is identical to the one predicted by the mathematical Markovian model we have presented. For low values of N e , the simulations are close to the pessimistic approximation (which is logical because at the beginning almost all hosts are fair) but when N e increases, it goes closer to the optimistic approximation because, in that case, most of the hosts are evil. Another interesting conclusion is that, in the simulations, we need larger buffer sizes to obtain the same kind of evolution. This is produced by the presence of a congestion window, which allows hosts to send new packets without having received the previous acknowledgements. Finally, remark that the mathematical model overestimates the rate of fair hosts. This is also logical because the real protocol reacts to the presence of evil hosts decreasing the sending rate of fair hosts, which is not a feature contemplated in the model. In any case, we can conclude that the model qualitatively reproduces the main characteristics of the real TCP Tragedy of the Commons and it is an appropriate starting point to develop more complete analytical models which could allow a better understanding of this problem.
Conclusions
We have established a mathematical model for the TCP Tragedy of the Commons based on a simplified assumption which consists on considering that the effect of the protocol is to render an ordered state to the network. In this state, we obtain an optimal collective strategy, where the resources are shared fairly among all hosts participating in the game. We have also defined an evil behavior driving to an strategy based on selfishness, which breaks the ordered state supplied by the protocol. In these circumstances, we have proved that the model predicts that there exists a threshold for the evil greediness over which the game takes the form of a Tragedy of the Commons.
Moreover, we have also shown that the effect of the tragedy is more remarkable when the network latency increases. We have demonstrated that this is due to the effect of duplicates. We have also proved that, assuming a worst case, the model predicts that the performance decays with the square of the number of hosts, for fair players; and proportionally to this number, for evil hosts. Besides, we have shown that when the incentive of hosts to become evil is higher, the tragedy becomes less significant; and when the tragedy is more prominent, the incentive decreases.
We have confirmed the validity of the mathematical model performing an extensive set of simulations using NS [17] . In all cases the main conclusion of the model have been ratified by the simulations.
A Evaluation of the sums
In this section our objective is to show the procedure we have followed to evaluate the expressions presented in Eqs. (4, 6, 8) . We only present the whole procedure for the first case, the others may be obtained using similar arguments. The sum presented in Eq.(3) can be calculated in the following way. First, observe that it can be written as
we may remark that
Hence, we can claim that
Substituting in Eq.(A.1) the appropriate values of ϕ(x) and x and operating, we obtain
Ne N e (A.5)
B Proof of the Tragedy of the Commons in the stateless model
In this section, our objective is to proof that the proposed stateless model presents a Tragedy of the Commons in a particular range of values of p. To be formal, we establish a precise definition of this term, which adapts to the particular problem we face. We consider a game to be a Tragedy of the Commons when the following two conditions are verified:
(1) Condition 1. There is always an incentive for a new host to become evil. That is R e (N, n + 1, p) > R f (N, n, p) for all n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}. This guarantees that the Nash equilibrium is reached when all hosts are evil (N e = N ). (2) Condition 2. The final yield for evil hosts in the Nash equilibrium is under the initial yield of fair hosts when all players collaborate. That is,
This definition guarantees the essential ingredient of a Tragedy of the Commons: in the Nash equilibrium the yield of the defectors is always under the initial reward of the fair players. Besides, it is adapted to the special characteristics of the models presented here.
Mathematically speaking, our objective if to prove the following theorem Theorem 1 In the stateless model, for any N > 1, p ∈ (
, 1) is a sufficient and necessary condition for the game to be a Tragedy of the Commons.
To proof the theorem, we split it into two parts. Assuming N > 1, they can be written as:
, 1) is a necessary condition for the game to be a Tragedy of the Commons.
Lemma 3 In the stateless model
, 1) is a sufficient condition for the game to be a Tragedy of the Commons.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
We start proving Lemma 2. Showing that p >
is a necessary condition is easy. We start by assuming that the game is really a Tragedy of the Commons. Then, Condition 1 is guaranteed, and R f (N, n, p) < R e (N, n + 1, p) for all n ∈ {1, ..N − 1}. So it is also satisfied for n = 0, which implies that R f (N, 0, p) < R e (N, 1, p) . Using Eqs. (3, 5, 7, 9, 10) , we may write this inequality in the following way
which in turn, is equivalent to (N, 0, p) . In this case, Condition 2 would not be satisfied. So, we may conclude that p < 1 is also a necessary condition for the game to be a Tragedy of the Commons. With these arguments, Lemma 2 is proved.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Now, we proof Lemma 3. To do so, we propose to split it into two independent parts, which are the following.
is a sufficient condition for Condition 1 to be verified.
Lemma 5
In the stateless model, p < 1 is a sufficient condition for Condition 2 to be verified.
We start proving Lemma 4. In this case, we assume the following inequality
then, it is also verified that
for all i ∈ 1, ..., N and for all n ∈ 0, ..., N . This may be easily proved by assuming a worst case (n = 0) and observing that it is verified for i = 1 and that the expression strictly decreases with i. Remark that Eq.(B.4) may be also written in the following way
which is equivalent to
which may be also written as
Now, we define the factor, f i , as
Observe that f i is always positive. In this situation, we can multiply Eq.(B.7) by f i without changing the inequality. Hence, we obtain a set of inequalities of the form
The sum of a number of these inequalities also verifies the same inequality. So, we may claim that
Observe that substituting f i by its value and operating, this can be also written as
Making a change of variables in the second part of the inequality, dividing by N and recovering the original expressions of p e E , p e F and p f F from Eqs. (3, 5, 7) , this can be written as
Which using Eq.(9) is equivalent to
Which is what we wanted to proof.
To prove Lemma 5, we must assume that p < 1, and then show that R f (N, 0, p) < R e (N, 1, p) . Recovering Eqs.(9,10), we can claim that
For simplicity of the notation, we consider the evil rate as a function of p: R e (N, N, p) = h(p). Observe, that for any value of N > 1, the derivative of h(p) with respect of p is always a positive number (as the sum of positive numbers):
So, this proves that h(p) strictly increases with p. Hence, for all p < 1, it must be satisfied that h(p) < h(1). It is easy to evaluate h(1) using Eq. (9) Then, Condition 2 is also satisfied, and Theorem 1 is proved.
C Proof of the Tragedy of the Commons in the Markovian model
Now, our purpose is to proof that the Markovian model also presents a Tragedy of the Commons. As we did in the preceding section, we establish two conditions guaranteeing the game to have this property:
(1) Condition 1. There is always an incentive for a new host to become evil. Observe that we ensure this condition to be true when the pessimistic evil rate is R In this case, our theorem is the following. This theorem may be split into two parts. Assuming N > 1 and m < N − 2, they can be written as.
Lemma 7
In the Markovian model, p > 2 N −m is a sufficient condition for Condition 1 to be satisfied.
Lemma 8
In the Markovian model, p ≤ 1 is a sufficient condition for Condition 2 to be satisfied.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 7
We start proving Lemma 7. For this, note that given that the real rate is never smaller than the pessimistic approximation. Then, we can guarantee that Condition 1 is satisfied when where 0 < p < 1. After some simple operations, we may show that this is equivalent to
If we call u = 1 − p, this is equivalent to ψ(u) = (n − 1) − (n + 1)u + (n + 1)u n − (n − 1)u n+1 ≥ 0. (C.12)
C.2 Proof of Lemma 8
Given that the real rate of the game is always under the results obtained using the optimistic approximation, Lemma 8 can be proved by showing that R So, Lemma 8 is proved.
